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THE REPUTATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF DISCLOSURES 
 





In our study we focus on the determinants of reputation and, in particular, on the 
relation between the quality of annual report disclosures of companies and their 
reputation. We try to bring together two strands of literature: the literature on corporate 
reputation and the literature on corporate disclosures. Using data on corporate reputation 
and on quality of annual report disclosures for a sample of Spanish companies, we test 
the hypothesis that annual report disclosure quality is a crucial determinant of corporate 
reputation. After controlling for other possible determinants, especially size, we find 
significant evidence in favour of our hypothesis. Firms with a better annual report 
disclosure score are more likely to be rated among the top 50 national companies in 
terms of corporate reputation. Moreover the disclosure score positively affects the 
reputation score.  
 






Nuestro trabajo se centra en los determinantes de la reputación y, en particular, 
en la relación entre la calidad de la revelación de los informes anuales de las empresas y 
su reputación. Tratamos de entrelazar dos grandes ramas de la literatura: la literatura 
relativa a la reputación corporativa y la relacionada con revelación en los informes 
anuales. Utilizando datos de reputación empresarial y de calidad de los informes anuales 
para una muestra de empresas españolas, contrastamos la hipótesis de que la calidad de 
la revelación del informe anual es un determinante significativo de la reputación 
empresarial. Después de controlar el efecto de otros posibles determinantes, 
especialmente el tamaño, encontramos evidencia significativa a favor de nuestra 
hipótesis. Las empresas con mayor calidad de información en sus informes anuales 
tienen más posibilidades de figurar entre las 50 mejores empresas españolas en términos 
de reputación. 
 
Palabras clave:  reputación empresarial, calidad de la revelación, informe anual.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Companies' strategic actions and their outcomes are continually evaluated, not 
just by the stock market, but by all the stakeholders of a company. It is this continuous 
general evaluation process that determines a company reputation. Previous studies have 
investigated the consequences of a strong reputation. In our study we focus on the 
determinants of reputation and, in particular, on the relation between the quality of 
annual report disclosures of companies and their reputation. 
Reputation is, by nature, a multidimensional concept including both financial 
and social aspects. However information disclosed periodically through the annual 
report seems to be a natural candidate as a crucial determinant of corporate reputation.  
For this reason, in this paper we try to bring together two strands of literature: 
the literature on corporate reputation and the literature on corporate disclosures. Using 
data on corporate reputation and on quality of annual report disclosures for a sample of 
Spanish companies, we test the hypothesis that annual report disclosure quality and 
corporate reputation are significantly correlated. After controlling for other possible 
determinants, especially size, we find significant evidence in favour of our hypothesis. 
Firms with a better annual report disclosure score are more likely to be rated among the 
top 50 national companies in terms of corporate reputation. Moreover the disclosure 
score positively affects the reputation score. 
The organisation of the paper is as follows. In the following section we review 
the literature on corporate reputation and corporate disclosure. Then we describe the 
sample and the data we use to test the significance of disclosure quality as a determinant 
of corporate reputation. In section four we present our empirical results. Finally we 
provide some conclusions.   3
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND HIPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT 
2.1.  Disclosure 
The theoretical literature on disclosure, starting with the seminal work of 
Milgrom (1981), supports the idea that increased disclosure quality can be an effective 
mean to avoid the adverse selection problem. Hence we expect firms facing an adverse 
selection problem to be more transparent than other firms. 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) already provided some evidence of a positive 
correlation existing between the level of adverse selection, measured by the correlation 
between returns and earnings, and a disclosure score.    
Amir and Lev (1996) find that earnings and book values for firms with 
significant levels of intangible assets tend to be excessively understated relative to their 
market values. Gelb (2002) confirms this idea and shows that firms that obtain 
significantly higher analysts' ratings for their investors’ relations programs or voluntary 
publications than for their annual reports tend to have greater levels of R&D and 
advertising expenditures. These findings suggest that firms with higher levels of 
intangible assets perceive mandatory accounting disclosures as a relatively ineffective 
means of communicating with investors and therefore are more likely to try to improve 
the quality of the information provided through their annual report. However it is an 
open question whether this communication strategy is effective in enhancing the image 
of the company.  
There is an extensive literature that uses disclosure indices to measure the 
impact of disclosure. The indices constructed to measure disclosure vary considerably 
among the different studies. In some studies only voluntary disclosure activity is 
considered (Firth, 1979; Chow and Wong-Boren,1987; Raffournier, 1991). In others, a 
wider perspective is adopted with both compulsory and voluntary disclosure being 
included in an index (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Choi, 1973; Barrett, 1976; Cooke, 1989; 
Giner, 1997). Indexes based on annual report information are more focused on the 
quality of compulsory disclosure, whereas indexes based on voluntary additional 
communication activity tend to measure disclosure quantity.    4
Botosan and Plumlee (2002), extending the work of Botosan (1997), study the 
effect of disclosure quality and quantity on the cost of equity capital. They find that 
better annual report disclosure decreases the expected cost of equity capital. However 
more timely (voluntary) disclosure increases the expected cost of equity capital, 
whereas better (voluntary) investor relations have no effect on this cost. Hence better 
quality of annual report disclosure seems to be a more effective communication mean 
than increased voluntary disclosure.  
Sengupta (1998) deals with the relationship between disclosure quality and 
quantity and cost of debt and finds a significantly negative correlation between these 
two variables. Given that he does not distinguish between annual report (quality) and 
other (quantity) disclosure, it is impossible to say which of these two possible 
components of the total disclosure score dominates. 
Lundholm and Myers (2002) analyse the information content of increased 
disclosure quantity and quality. They show that a higher value of the disclosure score in 
a certain year is significantly associated with more future earnings news being included 
in current returns. This proves the effectiveness of disclosure in communicating news 
about the future of the company, relevant for the actual valuation in the stock market.    
Bushee and Noe (2000) test the effects of increased disclosure quality on the 
composition of shareholding and on stock returns volatility. They find that a higher 
level of disclosure leads to bigger level of institutional shareholding, but has not effect 
on volatility. However an increase in disclosure quality leads to more transient 
shareholding and increased volatility. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) test whether a 
commitment to higher disclosure quality by a company affects the economic features of 
its stock. They find that German firms that opted to use IAS or US GAAP experience a 
lower bid-ask spread and more trading volume.   
Hutton et al. (2001), instead of using a score measure of disclosure activity, 
analyse a database of press news and investigate the effect of these news on analysts’ 
forecasts revisions and stock returns. They find that announcements of negative 
earnings surprises have always a negative effect, whereas announcements of positive 
earnings surprises have a positive effect only when supplemented with credible 
additional disclosures explaining the positive surprise.   5
2.2.   Reputation 
We can define reputation from at least two different point of view. 
First we can define it by looking at its effects. If we follow this route, then 
reputation can be defined as an intangible resource that can contribute to the 
performance and even to the survival of the firm (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Hall, 
1992, 1993; Rao, 1994; Barney and Hansen, 1994). 
Many advantages may derive from a good reputation: it may enable firms to 
charge premium prices (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986b; Fishman 
and Robb, 2002), enhance their access to capital markets (Beatty and Ritter, 1986), 
attract investors (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986a) and increase market value (Cahuvin and 
Hirschey, 1994) 
Deephouse (2000) revisits the reputation concept along this line and develops a 
variant called “media reputation”, defined as the overall evaluation of a firm presented 
in the media. He provides theoretical and empirical support for the conjecture that 
media reputation is a strategic resource leading to competitive advantage. He considers 
that a strong reputation provides at least three strategic benefits: it can create 
competitive barriers, it allows a firm to lower cost and it allows a firm to increase price. 
He claims that if media reputation is a resource, it should add value to the firm in at 
least one of this ways. Using data on a population of commercial banks competing in a 
single metropolitan area from 1988 through 1992, he shows that a favorable reputation 
is an intangible asset that increases firm performance. 
Roberts and Dowling (2002) provide further evidence in favor of the strategic 
value of corporate reputation. Using a sample of US firms between 1984 and 1998 they 
find that firms with a superior financial performance are more likely to sustain this 
superiority if their reputation ranking is higher. Again their result corroborates the idea 
that reputation is a crucial determinant of a company competitive advantage.  
While there seems to be a clear support both at the theoretical and at the 
empirical level for the idea that reputation benefits a company performance, the study of 
the determinants of such a valuable asset is less developed. 
This is an important area of research because reputation can also be defined as 
the result of a process. If we follow this alternative route we can define reputation as a   6
group of economic and non-economic attributes of an organization, generated from its 
past actions (Weigelt and Camerer, 1988). 
In order to be able to combine the strategic aspect and the historical aspect of 
reputation we accept the definition given by Fombrun (1996): 
‘a perceptual representation of a company’s past actions and future prospects 
that describe the firm’s overall appeal to all its key constituents when compared to 
other leading rivals.’ (Fombrun, 1996, p. 72) 
Companies' stakeholders may apply distinct criteria in evaluating corporate 
performance. So, a firm's reputation should be produced by the interactions of the firm 
with its stakeholders and, above all, by the information about the firm and its actions 
circulated among stakeholders, including specialised information intermediaries 
(Daellenbach et al., 1998; Fombrun, 1996; Logsdon and Wartick, 1995). Behaviours 
and outcomes that are not directly financial are significant contributors to reputation. 
Fombrun and Shanley (1990), in their seminal work on reputation determinants, show 
that stakeholders appear to construct reputation from a mix of signals derived from 
accounting and market information, but also from media coverage and other non-
economic cues. However they do not include any measure of disclosure quality and/or 
quantity among the possible determinants of reputation.  
The financial communication strategy of the company appears like a natural 
candidate as one of the determinants of corporate reputation. Rindova and Fombrun 
(1999) argue that companies’ strategic advantage arises from the interaction between 
the strategic “plot” of the company and the industry “paradigm” used by stakeholders to 
organise their beliefs while taking actions that may affect a company ultimate success. 
A crucial component of the strategic “plot” of a company is its strategic projections 
defined as “controlled images projected in social interaction through communication to 
secure favourable evaluations by others”
1. In other words the authors argue that the 
communication strategy of a company is crucial in determining its image in the market 
and may determine its ability to dominate its rivals.  
The quality of annual report disclosures is a natural element of a company 
communication strategy (i.e. its strategic projection) and corporate reputation is a 
crucial factor in shaping stakeholders’ beliefs (i.e. their industry paradigm). For 
                                                 
1 Rindova and Fombrun (1999) p.697    7
example, Sabaté and Puente (2003) develop a new measure of corporate reputation, 
based on a survey of managers of Spanish banks, and using factorial analysis they show 
that informative transparency is an important element of corporate reputation  
Hence it is extremely important to understand the relationship between these two 
variables in order to check whether the annual report is an effective communication tool 
and whether its transparency and information content have a positive or negative effect 
on corporate reputation. This is the aim of our empirical investigation that is presented 
in the following section. Using a sample of Spanish companies quoted on the Madrid 
Stock exchange we want to test whether annual report disclosures affect company 
reputation.       
Two recent studies have followed a similar path. Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) 
investigate whether societal pressure is positively related to the quantity of disclosure 
on financial derivative activities. Using a sample of Australian companies they find 
positive evidence in favour of their main hypothesis. As a proxy for societal pressure 
they use company affiliation to distinguished “clubs” of companies and find that 
companies that are members of these “clubs” provide a statistically significantly higher 
quantity of disclosure. The authors interpret this result as evidence that the fear of 
reputation costs (exclusion from these “clubs”) prompts more disclosure. This 
interpretation assumes the existence of a positive relationship between disclosure and 
reputation that actually is not directly proved. Moreover, given the number of possible 
determinants of the affiliation decision, the use of a more direct measure of reputation, 
if available, seems appropriate. 
Toms (2002) tests an hypothesis very similar to the one we are investigating in 
our studies. Using a sample of UK firms he finds positive evidence that environmental 
disclosures have a positive effect on environmental reputation.  
Our work extends the result by Toms (2002) in two directions.  
First of all the fact of focusing only on environmental reputation and 
environmental disclosure biases the results in favour of the hypothesis tested. 
Environmental issues are very sensitive issues and so a very close scrutiny by a 
company stakeholders is expected.  Moreover environmental disclosures are mostly 
provided on a voluntary basis. Hence it is expected that companies that are more open 
about their environmental related activities will have a better environmental reputation. 
However this result does not prove that the effort spent by a company in making its   8
annual report generally more transparent will be effective in enhancing the overall 
reputation of a company. Transparency on strategies, patents, product features, for 
example, may generate both costs and benefits to the company and hence it has to be 
proved that it increases its general reputation. 
Secondly Toms (2002) uses a sample of a priori large companies that quote on 
the London stock exchange. Given their size and the market they quote on, these 
companies are very likely to be closely scrutinised by the company stakeholders. These 
sample selection bias is again likely to bias the result in favour of the hypothesis tested. 
Our sample is not biased in terms of size we will show how size is crucial is 
determining corporate reputation. Moreover the Spanish stock market is still run by a 
relatively small number of active operators, who may have access to sources of 
information other than the annual report and consequently may give less importance to 
this source of information
2. These features make the Spanish market a good test of our 
main hypothesis of a positive relationship between annual report transparency and 
corporate reputation. 
3.  DATA 
3.1.  Sample selection 
Our sample selection begins with the 239 firm-year observations of the firms 
that quote on the Spanish continuous market and on the Madrid stock market in 1999 
and 2000, for which we have disclosure data
3. 49 firm-year observations were 
eliminated because of missing data on some of our control variables. The final sample is 
composed of 190 firm-year observations. 
                                                 
2 In year 2001 28% of the shares in the Madrid Stock exchange were held by “families”. Institutional 
investors, usually considered as those more interested in disclosures, owned only 4,86% of the total 
number of shares.  
3 Non quoted companies can not be included because disclosure data are not available for them.   9
3.2.  Dependent variable: corporate reputation data 
As a basis to construct the dependent variable for our study, we use the "Monitor 
Español de Reputación Corporativa (Spanish Observatory of Corporate Reputation)" 
(MERCO) a general index of corporate reputation. The MERCO reputation index is a 
score, on a scale from 0 to 1000, that measures the multidimensional concept of 
corporate reputation. Among its dimensions we can find financial performance, product-
service quality, corporate culture, international presence and Research and Development 
(R&D). 
This index, was developed by a market research institute and uses data collected 
from a sample of 10.000 managers of 2.150 companies. During the fall these managers 
are sent a questionnaire, and they are asked to nominate which companies of any sector 
have the best reputation and also to nominate the ones more appreciated in their own 
sector. Their answers are used to calculate the index of corporate reputation. The value 
of the index for the first fifty companies is publicly revealed at the beginning of the 
following solar year. MERCO was calculated for the first time in 2000. In our study we 
use the index for year 2000 (revealed in 2001) and for year 2001 (revealed in 2002) . 
When we use the logit model to estimate the probability of being included 
among the fifty reputation champions in a given year, we use as the dependent variable 
a dummy that is equal to 1 for a firm included among the fifty "champions" of MERCO 
and 0 otherwise (Dmerco). 
Given that the MERCO index measures reputation as perceived in the fall of a 
given solar year, managers perceptions will be based on the previous performance of the 
company. For this reason we decided to use lagged values for our independent 
variables. 
3.3.  Disclosure data 
In analysing information disclosed by firms, we concentrate on companies' 
annual reports. Data on the quality of this kind of information are regularly published by 
a prestigious business magazine (“Actualidad Económica”) that studies the annual 
reports of the companies that trade on the Spanish continuous market and on the Madrid 
stock market 
Several items are graded in order to produce a score that measures the quality of 
the information provided in the annual report. Among them we find: historical data,   10
analytical account of results, composition of shareholding, shares percentage held by the 
board of directors, order and clarity of the report, design, number of branches, directors' 
remuneration, returns on shares, market evolution, review of operations, on-line 
information. 
A pool of experts gives a score for each one of these items of the annual report. 
These scores are published annually. With these scores we have created a revelation 
index based on the sum of scores obtained divided by the maximum sum of scores 
obtainable. We have also considered the separation of the total index into two 
components
4: "Annual Information" and "Other Information". 
In the "Annual Information" index, we have tried to include all the items related 
to the annual financial statements, such as the Management Report or the President's 
Letter. 
Our second category of information comes under the heading of "Other 
Information" and includes items of the annual report that provides information not 
directly related to the annual financial statements. Examples are on-line information, 
good corporate governance policies, information about shareholders who hold more 
than ten percent of the firms shares, information on the number of shares that the board 
of directors hold. 
We want to stress that the MERCO score and the quality of annual report 
disclosure score are produced independently by two different organisations.  
3.4.  Other independent variables 
As control variables for our study we use: firm size, stock returns and risk. We 
base our the selection of independent variables on the seminal work by  Fombrun and 
Shanley (1990) and on the work by Toms (2002). We include only those variables that 
were found to be significant in these studies. However we exclude these two significant 
variables: institutional shareholdings and previous accounting profitability. In the case 
of institutional shareholdings the reason for excluding it is twofold. First of all the 
relative importance of institutional sharehodings in the Spanish stock market is still 
relatively low. For example in year 2001 only 4,86% of total market capitalization was 
                                                 
4 See the Appendix   11
owned by funds of any sort. Secondly data on shareoldings for Spanish companies are 
not easily available and not always reliable. 
With respect to previous accounting profitability, we have considered and used 
various specifications of  this variable. Its inclusion never changes the results regarding 
the effect of disclosure quality on reputation. Moreover this variable, depending on its 
specification, is either not significant or significant with a negative sign. For these 
reasons we have decided to drop it from the analysis
5.    
The final choice is in line with previous studies on the effects of disclosure like, 
for example, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) and Gelb (2002).  
Firm size, is measured as the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year 
2000 and 1999. These data have been obtained from the annual bulletin of the Madrid 
stock exchange. Because this variable is highly skewed and in line with previous 
literature we use its natural logarithm in our analysis (LNMVAL). 
As a measure of market performance of the firm we use compounded abnormal 
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where 
year
i CAR  is the compounded abnormal returns on stock i for year 1999 or 2000, 
and  t i AR ,  is the abnormal return on stock i for month t. 
As a measure of normal returns we opted to use shareholders required returns in 
relation to the risk level of each individual company. We estimate the risk factors of 
each stock using the Market Model for the T months prior to the month t, that is 
i mt i i it e R R + + = β α  
where: 
it R  is the return on common stock i at time t, 
                                                 
5 The results are available from the authors on request.   12
i α is the intercept term in the regression equation, 
i β is the systematic risk of common stock i, 
mt R  is the equally weighted market return at time t, 
i e  is an error term 
T = 60 
The monthly abnormal returns for each asset are then calculated in that month t 
as follows: 
) ( ˆ [ , , , , , t f t m i t f t i t i R R R R AR − + − = β ] 
where: 
t i AR , : Abnormal return on stock i for month t 
t i R ,  : Actual return on stock i for month t 
i β ˆ : Coefficient of market risk factor for stock i estimated for the period [t-T, t-1] 
t m R , : Market return for month t 
t f R , : Risk-free interest rate
6 for month t, 
The data have been obtained from daily bulletins of the Madrid stock exchange. 
A security total risk comprises systematic risk, the risk associated with the whole 
market, and unsystematic risk, the risk peculiar to the specific firm to which the security 
relates. Total risk was estimated by the standard deviation of the monthly abnormal 
returns for each year (STDEV). 
                                                 
6 considered as the mean interest rate of the monthly repos on government bonds, published in the 
Bulletin of the Annotations Centre of the Bank of Spain   13
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1.  Univariate analysis  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our independent variables. 
TABLE 1. Summary Statistics. N=190 
 
     Full Sample      
   TOT  IA OI  LNMVAL  CAR  STDEV 
MEAN   05860  0.6627  0.4756  13.1972  0.0308  0.0736 
MEDIAN  0.5800  0.6779  0.4634  13.1051  0.0217  0.0701 
MAXIMUM   0.9600  0.9830  0.9512  18.2089  0.8998  0.2957 
MINIMUM   0.2000  0.2203  0.0487  9.5243  -1.0079  0.0053 
STD.DEV  0.1509  0.1496  0.1875  1.8113  0.2987  0.0371 
n   190  190  190  190  190  190 
     DMERCO=0      
   TOT  IA OI  LNMVAL  CAR  STDEV 
MEAN   0.5575  0.6372  0.4429  12.6440  0.0579  0.0725 
MEDIAN  0.5600  0.6610  0.4390  12.8274  0.0599  0.0699 
MAXIMUM   0.8900  0.9491  0.9024  16.0830  0.8998  0.2957 
MINIMUM   0.2000  0.2203  0.0487  9.5243  -0.9314  0.0053 
STD.DEV  0.1434  0.1469  0.1765  1.4313  0.2977  0.0353 
n   151  151  151  151  151  151 
     DMERCO=1      
   TOT  IA OI  LNMVAL  CAR  STDEV 
MEAN   0.6961  0.7614  0.6022  15.3389  -0.0738  0.0780 
MEDIAN  0.6800  0.7796  0.5609  14.8123  -0.0286  0.0708 
MAXIMUM   0.9600  0.9830  0.9512  18.2089  0.5317  0.2942 
MINIMUM   0.4600  0.4915  0.2439  12.8132  -1.0079  0.0147 
STD.DEV  0.1284  0.1159  0.1769  1.5191  0.2822  0.0434 
n   39  39  39  39  39  39 
            
Mean and Median 
Equality tests 
        
Mean  t  5.4908 4.8939 5.0234  10.3505  2.4901 0.8145 
 p-value  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0136  0.4164 
Median Wilcoxon  4.9827  4.6969  4.6413  7.7721  2.3974  0.5715 
 p-value  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0165  0.5676 
            
 
TOT = index of annual report quality of disclosure. Total score divided by maximum score 
IA = index of quality of disclosure of financial statements related information within the annual report. Total score 
divided by maximum score 
OI = index of quality of disclosure of other information within the annual report. Total score divided by maximum 
score 
LNMVAL = natural logarithm of the market value at the 31
st of December 
CAR = compounded market adjusted returns 
STDEV = standard deviation of the market adjusted returns 
 
Mean equality test = single-factors, between-subjects ANOVA t test 
Median equality test =Wilcoxon signed rank non parametric test.   14
We can appreciate that the mean of quality of disclosure is bigger for the Annual 
Information category than for the Other Information. We interpret this as evidence that 
firms give more importance to disclosure of information related to traditional aspects of 
the Annual Report than to more innovative aspects.  
We divide the full sample into two groups: those companies that belong to the 
group of reputation "champions" and the other companies. As we can see the t and 
Wilcoxon tests reject the null hypothesis of mean and medians’ equality for the quality 
of disclosure. Firms with a higher reputation have better quality disclosures, either in its 
annual or other information categories of disclosure. 
We can also reject the null hypothesis of means and medians’ equality for firm 
size. Firms with more reputation are bigger than firms with less reputation. 
Table 2 presents Spearman and Pearson correlation coefficients between the 
independent variables. 
Size is positively related to our quality of disclosure variables. As we are 
interested in determining the effect of disclosure quality on corporate reputation we will 
have to be very careful in trying to separate its effect from size effects. However, using 
the “Condition Index” we have rejected the hypothesis of serious multicollinearity 
between our independent variables. Moreover we have repeated our estimations using 
orthogonalised variables, obtaining very similar results. 
We can also observe that compounded abnormal returns are negatively related to 
size, and to quality of disclosure.  
Finally, risk is negatively related to abnormal returns. 
4.2.  Multivariate análisis 
Our aim is to test whether there exists a relationship between corporate 
reputation and the quality of annual report disclosures and the direction of this 
relationship.  
However we face a truncated sample problem, given that we have a numerical 
value for the reputation index only for those companies that are ranked within the first 
50 reputation champions. In order to overcome this problem we run logit and tobit   15
regressions which allow us to use the full sample either in its dummy transformation 
(logit) or as a truncated sample (tobit). 
TABLE 2.  
 
Panel A. Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients 
(p-values). n=190 
 
 IA  OI  TOT  LNMVAL  CAR  STDEV 
IA   
1         
OI  0.6362 
(0.0000) ***  1       
TOT  0.9031 
(0.0000) *** 
0.8934 
(0.0000) ***  1     





(0.0000) ***  1    







(0.0030) ***  1  









(0.002) ***  1 
 
***P<0.01; **P<0.05; *P<0.10 
 
Panel B. Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
(p-values). n=190 
 
 IA  OI  TOT  LNMVAL  CAR  STDEV 
IA   
1          
OI  0.6695 
(0.0000) ***  1       
TOT  0.9256 
(0.0000) *** 
0.9008 
(0.0000) ***  1      





(0.0000) ***  1    







(0.0001)***  1  









(0.0000) ***  1 
 
***P<0.01; **P<0.05; *P<0.10 
 
4.2.1.  Logit results 
By using the logistic specification we estimate of the probability of being 
included among the fifty most admired companies.   16
Table 3 presents the estimates of the full logit model, with all the possible 
explanatory variables included.   
TABLE 3. Logit regressions 
Dependent variable: probability of being included in the 50 most admired Spanish Companies 
p-value within brackets 
 
 
PANEL A: TOT  PANEL B: IA  PANEL C: OI  PANEL D: COMBINED 
Model Full  Model  Simplified 
model  Full Model  Simplified 
model  Full Model  Simplified 
model  Full Model  Simplified 
model 
 
  (big 
companies) 
  (big 
companies) 




n  190  95  190  95  190  95  190 95 
Constant  -21.8493  -19.2972  -21.5614 -19.4112 -21.0989 -18.3107  -6.0198 -17.5067 
  (0.0000)***  (0.0000)***  (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)***
TOT  4.8929  6.1984        
  (0.0310)**  (0.0155)**        
IA     3.8818  5.4189       
     (0.0878)*  (0.0336)**        
OI        3.3047  3.6332  2.1887 4.0557 
         (0.0370)**  (0.0319)**  (0.0286)** (0.0224)** 
R E S I A            0.7560 3.6613 
           (0.4496) (0.2004) 
LNMVAL 1.2147  1.0177  1.2197 1.0319 1.2603 1.0890 5.3659 1.0176 
  (0.0000)***  (0.0004)***  (0.0000)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0004)***
CAR 0.1115    -0.0682    0.2415    0.1738  
  (0.9104)    (0.9443)  (0.8112)  (0.8631)  
STDEV  6.3135    6.1897  5.7167  6.1873  
  (0.3508)    (0.3577)  (0.3937)  (0.3607)  
LR test  86.6254  37.8652  84.6402 36.0387 86.2093 36.1876 86.7878 37.8652 
 (0.0000)  (0.0005)  (0.0000) (0.0014) (0.0000) (0.0013) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Akaike 
criterion 
0.405 1.0016 0.6224 1.0208 0.06141 1.0192  0.6216 1.0226 
   
***P<0.01; **P<0.05; *P<0.10 
 
 
As we can see size is highly significant with a positive coefficient. Bigger firms 
are more likely to be included among reputation "champions". Moreover, quality of 
disclosure variables are also significant: total disclosure and other information quality at 
a 5% level and annual information at a 10%. Hence disclosure affects positively and 
significantly the probability of being ranked among the top 50 reputation champions.   17
However we still want to isolate the effect of quality of disclosure from the size 
effect, to demonstrate that the first variable has a positive and significant effect on 
corporate reputation over and above the size effect. To do that, we run the same model 
for a sub-sample of "big" firms. If we choose a sub-sample where size vary much less 
than in the full sample, then we can assume that its effect on corporate reputation is at 
least highly mitigated. 
We take as "big" those companies located above the median and we  take as 
"small"  the others. Then we run the simplified logit model only for the "big" firms 
group.  
We see that the significance of the quality of information variables increases  
(they are significant at less of 5% level), whereas the significance of LNMVAL is quite 
similar, but in a couple of cases decreases slightly. We interpret this as positive 
evidence in favour of the hypothesis that disclosure quality has a positive effect on 
reputation once we control for size. 
Last two columns in Table 3 show the same full and simplified models, but now 
we introduce both annual and other information simultaneously (instead of grouping 
them in TOT or including them in separate regressions, as we have done before). In 
order to avoid the multicollinearity problem (IA and OI show a highly significant 
coefficient of correlation of more than 63%) we orthogonalise variable IA regressing it 
on OI; in this way, the variables that we include in our combined regression are OI and 
the residuals of the last regression (RESIA), apart from the rest of control variables. As 
we can observe, both variables show a clearly different behaviour, that is, while OI 
appears as positively and highly significantly (5%) related to the dependent variable, the 
coefficient of the orthogonalised variable, RESIA, although positive, is no significant. 
We can also observe, as before, that size has a big significance in determining the 
probability of being include among the 50 Spanish firms with more reputation, while 
firm performance and risk variables remain insignificant. 
In last column, we present the results of the simplified model, in which we again 
include both variables OI and RESIA for a sub-sample of big firms. We can appreciate 
that the coefficient of OI (4.0557) increases considerably while the coefficient related to 
the size variable decreases dramatically. Annual Information category of disclosure 
appears again as no significantly related to the dependent variable.    18
4.2.2.  Tobit results 
As we have already remarked, we are dealing with a truncated sample because 
all the companies that do not reach one of the fifty top positions in the reputation scale 
are given the same score (i.e. 0). A standard estimation technique for truncated samples 
is the tobit model
7. Given that our dependent variable in reality is not qualitative, the 
advantage of the tobit specification over the logit is that it can take into account the 
variation in the values of the dependent variable for those observations that are not 
truncated.  The results of the tobit regressions are presented in Table 4. 
TABLE 4. Tobit regressions 
Dependent variable: index of reputation (Inmerco) 
p-value within brackets 
 
 
PANEL A:TOT  PANEL B: IA  PANELC:OI PANELD:  COMBINED 






































      




    















































2  0.70  0.64 0.70 0.63 0.70 0.64 0.70 0.64 
 
***P<0.01; **P<0.05; *P<0.10 
 
 
As usual size is always highly significant. However disclosure quality is also 
always significant with the positive sign. Moreover we can observe that when we break 
disclosure quality into its two components (IA y OI), the “Other Information” index 
appears to be more significant that the “Annual Information” index. These results 
confirm the logit results of the previous section. Moreover they show that better annual 
report disclosures not only increase the probability of being included in the selected 
                                                 
7 Cf. Greene (2002)   19
group of reputation champions, but also increase the level of reputation for those 
companies that are included among the reputation champions.  
As we did for the logit regressions, we have repeated the analysis for the sub-
sample of “big” firms and dropping non significant variables. Again the significance of 
the disclosure quality variables increases. 
Last two columns in Table 4, show the results of the tobit model in which we 
have include simultaneously both categories of disclosure: Other Information (OI), and 
the part of the Annual Information unrelated to OI (RESIA). From these results, we can 
observe again the high significance of the positive sign of size and OI (with significance 
of 1% and 5% respectively), while the rest of variables appear as no significant. Finally, 
we repeat the analysis for a sub-sample of big firms, and again our results are 
confirmed: the positive sign of OI and its significance increase (now it is 1%), the 
coefficient of size decreases slightly and Annual Information disclosure remains 
insignificant. 
5.  INTERPRETATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our aim was to check whether disclosure quality is a significant determinant of 
corporate reputation. To test this relationship we used a sample of Spanish firms that 
quote on the Madrid Stock exchange.  For these companies we have access to a 
disclosure quality index and to the results of a survey on corporate reputation.    
We have obtained two clear results. 
First of all, according to our analysis, size is a crucial and positive determinant 
of corporate reputation. It is important to stress that we used a market variable as our 
measure of size. This is certainly a more visible measure of size than other possible 
candidates such as total assets. This measure of size can act as a proxy of many 
determinants of reputation. Media visibility, for example, is one of the possible 
determinants of reputation that has not been included in our analysis. Its effect can be 
captured by size if we believe that bigger companies are more likely to be the object of 
news and articles. If this is the case then our result shows that media visibility positively 
affects company reputation.    20
We should also remember how our dependent variable is obtained. As we 
described before it is an index based on the results of a questionnaire. Hence another 
possible explanation of our findings has to do with the possible “framing effects” that 
size can generate at the time of answering to the questionnaire. It could be claimed that 
managers when asked to nominate the most admirable companies are more likely to 
nominate “big” companies. If this was the case, then our result would have at least two 
implications. First of all it would tell us that market size can be used as a good proxy for 
survey based reputation rankings, when these rankings are not available. Secondly it 
would point us at least one possible limitation of these survey based reputation 
rankings, i.e. they may be biased by size generated framing effects.    
However our main interest was the effect of annual report disclosure quality on 
corporate reputation. Our second clear result is that disclosure has a significantly 
positive effect on reputation. This result characterizes disclosure quality as a 
fundamental component of the strategic projection of a firm that tries to reach a 
dominant position in its market. In this sense it adds another item to the list of the 
empirically documented positive effects of increased disclosure quality and/or quantity.   
Moreover when we break our disclosure quality measure into more conventional 
annual (accounting) information and other information, we find that it is the other 
information component that has the stronger effect. This result provides empirical 
support to the recent literature on the loss of relevance of traditional accounting 
information as an effective communication mean between companies and their 
stakeholders.       
Given the size of our sample these results are clearly preliminary, but they show 
that the study of the reputational consequences of disclosure quality may be an 
interesting field for future research.   21
APPENDIX 
 
Our key independent variable is a measure of the quality of the companies’ 
annual report disclosures produced by a well known business magazine ("Actualidad 
Económica"). This measure is broken-down into two categories: Annual Information 
and Other Information, each covering a series of items of disclosure, which are 
described below.  
 
The category “Annual Information”, includes the following items:  
The President's Letter: If it is signed during the first quarter of the year, it gets one 
point. The contents of the letter may be awarded up to 5 points if a clear 
definition of the company’s strategy is outlined. (Scale: from 0 to 6 points).  
Historical Data: 2 points if the main data for year t-2 of the profit and loss account and 
of the balance-sheet appear. 4 points if those for year t-3 are also included, and 6 
if those for year t-4 appear as well. (Scale: from 0 to 6 points).  
Basic Data: 8 points if a summary of the main data of the accounts, financial ratios and 
market ratios appear. Both the quantity and the quality of the data are evaluated. 
(Scale: From 0 to 8 points).  
Analysis of results: Full analysis of the operations, mean total assets, quarterly results 
analysis of year t compared to year t-1 are given up to 6 points. If only data for 
year t are included, 4 points are given. (Scale: from 0 to 6 points).  
The Management’s Report: 6 points, if all legally required information is included: 
i.e., the evolution of the business and of the current situation of the company, 
events that occurred after the closing of the audit, the evolution of the company, 
its purchases of its own shares and R+D activities. The clarity and the quantity 
of the information is awarded up to 12 points. (From 0 to 12 points).  
Order and Clarity: the clarity, conciseness and precision of the language are valued 
here, as well as whether the information follows a logical order. (From 0 to 3 
points).    22
Design: The quality of the design and its graphics and pictures. (From 0 to 2 points).  
Affiliates: Two points for information about the activity, home, participation, own 
funds and results of different affiliates. 4 points if the dividends received by the 
affiliates and their book-values are included. 6 points if the accounts are 
included. (From 0 to 6 points).  
Segmental reporting: Break-down of the business by categories of activities and 
geographical markets. A complete analysis of the contribution to the overall 
results for each of these areas is rewarded with 4 points. (From 0 to 4 points).  
The Audit: 4 points for audits without qualifications, 2 for those that contain 
qualifications and zero if the auditor indicates limitations or reserves his opinion. 
The cost of the audit is evaluated on a 2-point scale. (From 0 to 6 points).  
 
The category “Other Information”, covers the following items:  
Shareholders: 2 points if it gives information about the shareholders who hold more 
than 10% of the firm’s total stock. 4 points if the percentage of total capital is 
specified, and 6 if any additional information is included. (From 0 to 6 points).  
Board of Directors: 2 points for information on the shares held by the board. 4 points if 
the participation of some of its members is also specified, and 6 if it is detailed. 
(From 0 to 6 points).  
Directors’ Remuneration: If there is global information on the total remuneration 2 
points are given. 4 points if there is a breakdown. 6 points if the breakdown of 
Directors’ remuneration is done nominally. (From 0 to 6 points).  
Stock options plans: A description of the plans, beneficiaries, conditions, cost to the 
company and other characteristics. To achieve the maximum points, the options 
granted to their executives and directors must be broken-down by individual. 
(From 0 to 4 points).  
Other Information: up to 4 points are granted to companies that offer excellent 
information on their true situation. The degree of concentration of sales and 
suppliers; their market-share; a market analysis; the volume of distribution   23
channels, or, information on either quality or environmental initiatives, are some 
of the items considered here. (From 0 to 4 points).  
On-line Information: The inclusion of the annual report in the company’s web 
page is evaluated on a two-point scale. If quarterly reports are also included it is added 2 
more points. (From 0 to 4 points).  
Good Policy Norms: A complete and detailed declaration of the firm’s norms 
and policies. To achieve the maximum points, the company must explain to what degree 
it has managed to implement the recommendations included in the Spanish good 
governance ("Olivencia") Report. (From 0 to 5 points).  
Evolution of the Market: 3 points if information is included on the evolution of 
the interest-rate, recruiting volume and days of trading. 4 if market ratios are included. 5 
if the rate is compared to the general Stock Market index or the Ibex35, and 6 if it also 
includes the sector’s index. (From 0 to 6 points).  
 
The category "Total Information" is simply the sum of the other two 
categories.   24
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